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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS AND
THE NATURALIZATION LAWS
In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1957)
An alien petitioned for naturalization seeking to come under the
exception provided for conscientious objectors, allowing exemption from
taking that part of the oath of allegiance requiring performance of
military service. Petitioner claimed to fall within the classification of
conscientious objection by reason of his "religious training and belief."
The court held that petitioner qualified under the exemption, treating
"religious training and belief" as a single concept and ruling that a
personal religious code based on a relation to a Supreme Being is suf-
ficient, although not derived from the formal religious tenets of the
church to which he belonged.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521 (McCarran-
Walter Act) provides exemption from a part of the oath in naturaliza-
tion proceedings for conscientious objectors who can satisfy the test by
any showing that they are "opposed to bearing arms in the Armed Forces
of the United States by reason of religious training and belief."2 This
is in effect a codification of the majority holding in Giroyard V. United
States,3 wherein the earlier holdings of United States v. Schwimmer"4
United States v. Macintosh,' and United States v. Bland' were overruled.
The Girouard decision, purporting to interpret the intent of Congress as
expressed in the statutory oath, in effect accepted the rationale of the
dissents of Justice Holmes7 and Chief Justice Hughes' in the earlier
cases. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority said:
The oath required of aliens does not in terms require that they
promise to bear arms. Nor has Congress expressly made any
such finding a prequisite to citizenship. To hold that it is re-
quired is to read it into the act by implication. But we could
not assume that Congress intended to make such an abrupt
and radical departure from our traditions unless it spoke in
unequivocal terms.'
The 1952 Act specifically defines "religious training and belief" as "an
individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties su-
perior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include
166 STAT. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §1101-1503 (1953).
2 66 STAT. 258 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §1448 (1953).
3 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
4 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
G283 U.S. 605 (1931).
6 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
7 United States v. Schwimnmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929).
9 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 64 (1946).
s United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 627 (1931).
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essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely per-
sonal moral code." 10
The definition, due to the recent incorporation of this language in
the statute, has to date received scant consideration in its application to
the naturalization area. 1 The Universal Training and Service Act of
1948,1" containing identical language, has been examined in a con-
siderably greater number of cases. Under that Act the courts' pro-
nouncements are definitely at variance with the views taken in the Hansen
case. The courts, adhering to the strictest statutory interpretation, deny
that the right of a registrant to exemption under the law "can rise above
the tenets of his faith as taught by the church through which he finds
personal expression."'" Again, in United States v. Hen,'4 the defendant
"only sought to show that he belonged to a church that would support
him in his own individual belief whether he believed in military service
or whether he was a conscientious objector. If the board should allow
exemption for one who is a member of such a church then the whole
purpose of the statute would fail and each case would be determined on
whether or not the individual himself was a conscientious objector. That
would open the door to chaos and fraud. . . ."" Or again, where
defendant based his belief on "thinking during the past 19 years,"1 6
although he claimed "a basis for his beliefs in the Methodist Church
which he attended as a youth," the court demanded something of a more
substantial nature and found that such evidence would be a basis for
deAial of a claim as a conscientious objector.'7 The courts in these cases
are seeking an objective standard, through church affiliation, in hopes of
avoiding the problems of subjectivity inherent in the whole area of
sincerity of belief.'"
Standing apart from the above cases and considering the naturaliza-
tion proceedings as distinguished from nationals seeking classification
under The Universal Training and Service Act is In re Nissen."2 This
was a petition by a member of the Lutheran Church whose "own belief
rather than the doctrine of the church" caused him to refuse to bear
10 66 STAT. 259 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. §1448 (1953).
1 In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1957); In re Nissen, 146 F.
Supp. 361 (D. Mass. 1956); contra, Jost v. United States, 117 Cal. App. 2d 379,
256 P.2d 71 (1953), rvsd., 347 U.S. 901 (1954) (on confession of error by the
United States).
1262 STAT. 604, 612-613 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. §451,456.
13Roberson v. United States, 208 F.2d 166, 169 (10th Cir. 1953).
14 112 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
15 Id. at 75.
16 United States v. Lime, 121 F. Supp. 750, 758 (D.N.J. 1954).
17 Id.
18 Selby v. United States, 250 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1957).
19 138 F. Supp. 483 (D. Mass. 1955), reconsideration granted, 146 F. Supp.
361 (D. Mass. 1956).
[Vol. 19
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
arms. In the initial hearing, the statutory requirements were defined as
more than "a course of self instruction in the Bible in a sympathetic
atmosphere." 2  However, on reconsideration of the case the necessity
of training?' as a basis of belief was abandoned. "As far as Congress
was thinking of training it regarded it as meaning no more than indivi-
dual experience supporting belief; a mere background against which
sincerity could be tested." 2 In the alien naturalization cases the courts
are moving away from the rigid formula invoked in the Universal
Training cases and toward a flexible criteri of "honest" conviction.
The determinations of the courts in both the naturalization and
induction cases reflect the pervasive nature of freedom of religion as a
motivating factor for the decisions. However, the principle case and the
Nissen case, dealing with naturalization, exhibit a tendency toward a
liberal construction of the statutory language, even though an alien
clearly has no constitutional right to citizenship23 and does not fall within
the protection of the First Amendment.2 4 The naturalization law in-
corporates the attitude of the Girouard case that aliens should be treated
the same as citizens in this matter and not excluded due to their refusal
to bear arms as the privilege of conscientious objection is afforded to
citizens. The Universal Training and Service cases, on the other hand,
strictly construe that statute despite the immediate coverage applicable to
citizens. The current trend might potentially lead to the anomalous
situation of privileges being allowed aliens petitioning for naturalization
that are denied citizens seeking classification under the induction laws.
This duality of standard under the two different statutes, however, pre-
sents a situation where the liberality found in the naturalization of a
young alien fit for military duty may come back to haunt a court taking
the conservative approach in the Universal Training and Service cases.
The explanation may lie in the proximity to the actuality of combatant
service-causing the courts to demand greater proof of sincerity of belief
in the case of a potential combatant than that of an alien, who may not
be subject to military service. In the instant case, the petitioner was fifty-
nine years of age, and thus, practically no longer subject to military
service even if he had been a citizen.
Based on the holdings of In re Nissen and In re Hansen, the con-
clusion is inescapable that the law in those alien naturalization cases in-
volving religious ideologies is drawing as close as the statute permits to
20 138 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D. Mass. 1955).
21 Definition of training under the Selective Service Act of 1940 (pre-
Girouard): United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943),
and Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1946).
22 146 F. Supp. 361, 363 (D. Mass. 1956).
23 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ; Turner
v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
24 U.S. CowsT., Amend. 1, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... "
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the Holmesian philosophy: "If there is any principle of the Constitution
that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought-not free thought for those that agree with
us but freedom for the thought that we hate. I think that we should
adhere to that principle with regard to admission into, as well as life
within this country." 25
The impact of the principal case in the naturalization field will
depend on the continued acceptance of its underlying policy considera-
tions. The court demonstrates less qoncern with immediate precedent
than with propriety; less involvement with individual words than with
overall statutory purpose; less emphasis on narrow interpretation than
broad ideals. It is a reflection of American concepts in an area not
literally covered, but strongly influenced -by the spirit of national
traditions.
Phillp E. Stebbins
25 United States v. Schwirnmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-655 (1929).
